Launching nuclear weapons is a simple process in the movies—turn some keys or push a button, and off they go.

But buttons and keys have very little to do with one of the most sophisticated and secretive systems of military command and control ever invented; a shadow world where specialised tools like footballs and biscuits can destroy our civilization within minutes.

This article explains that bizarre statement, while also exploring the history, technology, and military procedures behind America’s nuclear command-and-control system.

And last, but not least, an extraordinary US military doctrine is revisited – an official protocol established over a decade ago that clarifies in shocking detail the ease with which American presidents can launch nuclear weapons.

Footballs and Biscuits

US presidents can order nuclear strikes at any time, from anywhere in the world. The power to do so literally travels with them in a black leather case officially known as the Presidential Emergency Satchel, but commonly called the football.

The satchel is never far from the president’s side, carried by a military officer whose sole duty is ensuring the Commander in Chief can issue nuclear launch orders quickly in an emergency.

Inside the satchel is a customized aluminum Zero Halliburton briefcase with communications equipment, authentication codes, and a small booklet of nuclear strike options known as the Gold Book. Those options designate various targets chosen by military strategists at the Pentagon, including target sets, estimated casualties, and projected fallout paths.

But the football is useless without the biscuit—a small plastic card bearing codes for individual attack options that the president personally carries at all times. A challenge question will also be asked by the senior officer on duty at the National Military Command Center (NMCC), to which the president must respond by referring to information on the biscuit.

The entire system is meant to ensure that no one can issue fraudulent commands by impersonating the president. Yet those very same precautions also ensure that no one can cancel the president’s order once it’s authenticated.

Origin of Concept

The football was the brain-child of Captain Edward Beach Jr., an aide to President Dwight D. Eisenhower in the 1950s. Concern had grown about the Soviets’ ability to strike by surprise and destroy missiles in their silos before they could launch.

But the football made that possibility unlikely, a mobile command post constantly linked to the NMCC. With it, the president can confirm incoming attacks, consult advisors, and issue launch orders through secure military channels within minutes – in theory at least.

But the football placed launch authority in the hands of one individual, with no one permitted to question orders or evaluate the president’s state of mind in the minutes remaining. For seven decades, American presidents from Dwight Eisenhower to Donald Trump were followed by that ominous black satchel we hope never gets used.

The Two-Person Rule and the Chain of Command

Contrary to popular depictions, launching nuclear weapons involves much more than buttons and keys. Once issued, nuclear attack orders trigger a highly choreographed process within the nuclear command and control system (NC2).

First, the president must pass an identity check before launch codes on the biscuit can be used – codes that must also match a secret list held at the Pentagon. After confirmation, the order is transmitted through encrypted channels to missile crews and strategic bombers worldwide.

At each stage, military officers unseal orders to perform independent authentications via the “two-person rule”—a safeguard requiring two individuals working together to prevent unauthorized action. The process is meant to confirm that an order actually came from the president before irreversible action is taken.

Once the president’s order is issued, it takes less than five minutes for land-based Minuteman III ICBMs and fifteen minutes for submarine-based Trident II D5 missiles to launch. Speed is often considered an asset by military planners, but it can be a weakness as well. Once ICBMs launch, they cannot be recalled or deactivated. Even if the order is found to be mistaken or generated by a false alarm, missiles in flight will strike their targets, and warheads will detonate.

Authority Without Restraint

American nuclear planners understood that launch within minutes left no time for congressional review or cabinet debate. Presidential advisors can counsel restraint in those critical minutes, but their input is not binding.

This centralization of power for purposes of speed was justified during the Cold War as necessary for deterrence. But many analysts now question the compatibility of such unrestrained power with the ongoing spread of nuclear weapons. Today, thirty-four years after the Cold War ended, more individuals around the globe hold nuclear launch authority than ever before – the unquestioned power to kill millions by personal command. 

Some lawmakers proposed legislation requiring a second civilian official, such as the vice president or secretary of defense, to concur with nuclear launch orders. But no legislation has been offered to date, with concerns about slowing response times still greater than worries about unilateral command.

Allied Systems and Shared Risks

America is not alone in maintaining quick-launch nuclear systems. Russia, China, France, the United Kingdom, and several other countries maintain procedures that combine rapid response times with central control. Footballs and biscuits are not featured in all systems, but each one has mechanisms for launching fast.

Yet, regardless of structure, the primary weakness in all those systems is identical: the perceived need to act faster than the incoming threat. Most intercontinental ballistic missiles can reach their targets in thirty minutes – a fleeting window that favors immediate retaliation before critical information is considered, or even available.

As a result, nuclear-armed nations find themselves in a vulnerable situation, where the decision to go nuclear has also made them targets for annihilation. The football was the physical manifestation of Mutually Assured Destruction during the Cold War, and yet, in retrospect, even the name conjures up visions of insanity when you think about it.

ANNEX 3-72

In 2015, the Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education, garrisoned at Maxwell Air Force Base in Alabama, issued ANNEX 3-72 NUCLEAR OPERATIONS. The doctrine stands today.

It states: “The president may direct the use of nuclear weapons through an executive order via the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the combatant commanders and, ultimately, to the forces in the field exercising direct control of the weapons.”

That’s as clear as it gets, and indicates the road to nuclear war has recently shortened. In April 2025, President Trump replaced four-star General Charles Q. Brown with General Dan Caine as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Nicknamed “Rasin Caine” for his aggressive attitude, President Trump once said that General Caine told him, “I would kill for you sir,” before putting on a MAGA hat.

General Caine denies the comment today, but the concern is obvious. With three stars at retirement, the General returned to active duty and received a waiver to bypass the usual requirement that Joint Chiefs of Staff have at least four stars for consideration as Chairman.

If President Trump ordered General Caine to use nuclear weapons, and the General complied, the order would soon be received by launch officers in the field. Some would undoubtedly reject the order, but most would obey. WWIII would inevitably follow – at least for a few minutes.

Depending on Perfection

Launching nuclear weapons involves perfect decisions under stressful conditions. Technology can fail, mistakes happen, and communications break down. Yet nuclear launch protocols assume – and depend upon – perfection.

Such an assumption is dangerous considering the stakes. A random event during a crisis could create a disaster that cannot be undone. It also seems obvious that, as automation and artificial intelligence are increasingly integrated into nuclear defense systems, opportunities for human input will continue to shrink.

An Uneasy Bargain With Power

At Our Planet Project Foundation, we see footballs and biscuits as manifestations of humanity’s uneasy bargain with power.

Built to enable the Cold War doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction, they remind us that life and death rests in fallible human hands and imperfect systems. After all, even the name Mutually Assured Destruction conjures up visions of insanity when you think about it.

Awareness must therefore evolve into accountability. The better we understand how launch decisions are made, and made within minutes that could define centuries, the better our ability to question why nuclear footballs and biscuits still exist.